This paper sets out an organizing framework for the field of social ontology, the study of the nature of the social world. The subject matter of social ontology is clarified, in particular the difference between it and the study of causal relations and the explanation of social phenomena. Two different inquiries are defined and explained: the study of the grounding of social facts, and the study of how social categories are “anchored” or set up. The distinction between these inquiries is (...) used to clarify prominent programs in social theory, particularly theories of practice and varieties of individualism. (shrink)

The term queer has recently come into wide use to designate distinctive emphases in the politics and the intellectual study of sexuality. This article explores the unfortunate irony that most work falling under the rubric of queer theory has been undertaken largely at some remove from the discipline of sociology, despite the pioneering role that an earlier generation of sociologists played in formulating influential conceptions of the social construction of sexuality. The article suggests important continuities between the earlier sociological theories (...) and recent queer theory, but also analyzes the new challenges that queer theorists have posed by insisting on the indispensability of questions of sexual "marginality" to the larger understanding of social and cultural organization. The article concludes by suggesting how sociologists might engage with such a project. (shrink)

This article traces the efforts of the National Council of Churches in Brazil to endorse the document ‘Christian witness in a multi-religious world’ and to implement its recommendations in the practice of churches in Brazil. The reception of the document is placed into the historical development of the ecumenical movement in Brazil since an important conference in 1962 in Recife, Brazil, and the impact the Second Vatican Council had in the Latin American country. The focus is then on how the (...) religious plurality in the country started to be perceived. Three examples follow showing how fundamentalist Christian groups oppose other religious expressions in the country and how the churches united in the council are challenged by the spirit of witnessing in respect to embrace pluralism. (shrink)

With the discovery of consistent non-Euclidean geometries, the a priori status of Euclidean proof was radically undermined. In response, philosophers proposed two revisionary interpretations of the practice: some argued that Euclidean proof is a purely formal system of deductive logic; others suggested that Euclidean reasoning is empirical, employing concepts derived from experience. I argue that both interpretations fail to capture the true nature of our geometrical thought. Euclidean proof is not a system of pure logic, but one in which our (...) grasp of the content of geometrical concepts plays a central role; moreover, our grasp of this content is a priori. (shrink)

L’ouvrage d’Anne Cova, tiré principalement de la partie inédite de sa thèse doctorale soutenue en 1994, porte sur l’histoire des débats autour d’une question : « la liberté de la maternité », dont les contours s’étendent bien au-delà des discussions entre les féministes et leur opposants, et qui d’une certaine manière reste aussi « brûlante » de nos jours qu’il y a cent ans, soit la période étudiée. Le dépouillement des plus importants périodiques spécialisés publiés entre 1890 et 1939 (Régén...

Moral distress arises when healthcare providers recognize that a professional ethical obligation cannot be met due to constraints beyond their perceived or actual control. In this commentary, I expand a bit on the meaning and implications of moral distress identified among Israeli maternal-fetal medicine (MFM) physicians who participate in feticide. I examine briefly how exploring unmet professional obligations (for example, preventing harm), identifying who is burdened by the decisions of others, and drawing attention to what is owed to the woman, (...) fetus, and physician may illuminate relevant ethical issues not currently considered in the calculus of lateterm abortion decisions. Ultimately, the goal is not to mitigate MFM physicians’ moral distress, but to adequately address the problems that create it. (shrink)

Perhaps nothing so radically changes one’s value perspective as psychosis. In a moving article, writer Mark Lukach describes his wife Giulia’s struggle with an illness presumed to be bipolar disorder. A woman with a “concrete life plan … to become a director of marketing at a fashion company and have three kids by the time she turned 35”, Gulia’s acute psychosis resulted in her ranting “unintelligible babble about heaven, hell, angels, and the devil”. For her husband, Gulia had become a (...) different person; “the person you love is no longer there, replaced by a stranger who’s shocking and exotic”.Yet, change to value systems is ubiquitous and usually far less dramatic than that occurring in... (shrink)

The European Legacy, Volume 16, Issue 4, Page 531-534, 01Jul2011.

This collection explicates one of the core ideas underpinning Minimalist theory--explanation via simplification. It introduces and advances Minimalist theory for students and scholars in linguistics and related sub-disciplines of psychology, philosophy, and cognitive science.

What do we mean by ‘countable’?Export citation.

This paper presents a monotonic system of Post algebras of order +* whose chain of Post constans is isomorphic with 012 ... -3-2-1. Besides monotonic operations, other unary operations are considered; namely, disjoint operations, the quasi-complement, succesor, and predecessor operations. The successor and predecessor operations are basic for number theory.

Both aggressive and non-aggressive strategies of competition pervade the poetics of the “Iliad”, the “Odyssey”, and the “Argonautica”, shaping the expression of narrator-ethos and implicit standards of poetic quality. Studying a poetics of competition in scenes of conjugal bedroom conversation in Il. 3.421-448, Od. 23.295-343, and A. R. 4.1068-1111 benefits understanding of the text-immanent strategies employed to achieve and advertise the superior quality of these poems. The poetics of competition in Il. 3.421-448 can be read against Middle-Eastern poetry and the (...) Epic Cycle, that of Od. 23.295-343 against the Iliad and perhaps lost Nostoi-traditions, while A. R. 4.1068-1111 engages not just the Odyssey, but also Herodotus 3.134 f., the “Dios apate” in Il. 14, and Peripatetic and Alexandrian scholarship. (shrink)

We introduce agreement reducibility and highlight its major features. Given subsets A and B of, we write if there is a total computable function satisfying for all,.We shall discuss the central role plays in this reducibility and its connection to strong‐hyper‐hyper‐immunity. We shall also compare agreement reducibility to other well‐known reducibilities, in particular s1‐ and s‐reducibility. We came upon this reducibility while studying the computable reducibility of a class of equivalence relations on based on set‐agreement. We end by describing the (...) origin of agreement reducibility and presenting some results in that context. (shrink)

Clarke A. Chambers interviews Marcia Eaton, professor in the Department of Philosophy.

Marcia Cavell draws on philosophy, psychoanalysis, and the sciences of the mind in a fascinating and original investigation of human subjectivity. A "subject" is a creature, we may say, who recognizes herself as an "I," taking in the world from a subjective perspective; an agent, doing things for reasons, sometimes self-reflective, and able to assume responsibility for herself and some of her actions. If this is an ideal, how does a person become a subject, and what might stand in (...) the way? One of Marcia Cavell's guiding premises is that philosophical investigation into the specifically human way of being in the world cannot separate itself from investigations of a more empirical sort. Cavell brings together for the first time reflections in philosophy, findings in neuroscience, studies in infant development, psychoanalytic theory, and clinical vignettes from her own psychoanalytic practice. (shrink)

In his insightful and challenging paper, Jonathan Schaffer argues against a distinction I make in The Ant Trap (Epstein 2015) and related articles. I argue that in addition to the widely discussed “grounding” relation, there is a different kind of metaphysical determination I name “anchoring.” Grounding and anchoring are distinct, and both need to be a part of full explanations of how facts are metaphysically determined. Schaffer argues instead that anchoring is a species of grounding. The crux of his (...) argument comes in the last sections of his paper, in his discussion of “exportation,” the relations strategy, and the definitions strategy. I am inclined to agree that Schaffer’s interesting strategies offer the best choices for the philosopher who wants to insist that anchoring is a species of grounding. But both, I will argue, are fatally flawed. I do not take the separation of anchors from grounds lightly, but find the evidence in its favor overwhelming. And once the distinction is made, I find anchoring to be a powerful practical tool in metaphysics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 99, Issue 3, Page 768-781, November 2019. (shrink)

Gideon Rosen (2014) has drawn our attention to cases of duress of a particularly interesting sort: the person's ‘mind is not flooded with pain or fear’, she knows exactly what she is doing, and she makes a clear-headed choice to act in, as Rosen says, ‘awful ways’. The explanation of why we excuse such actions cannot be that the action was not voluntary. In addition, although some duress cases could also be viewed as necessity cases and thus as justified, Rosen (...) wisely sets aside that complicating factor by zeroing in on those cases where the action clearly is not justified. So why do we excuse in these cases, where the action is not justified and the agent acted voluntarily?Rosen thinks the key lies in the ‘ill will’ condition, ‘the idea that an act is blameworthy only if it manifests insufficient concern or regard for those affected’. He says this is relatively uncontroversial; much of my paper is taken up with calling the ‘ill will’ condition into question. I also take issue with Rosen on just how justifications and excuses differ. I argue in favour of understanding justifications (in a context where we are asking how justifications and excuses differ) as not requiring truth, but only reasonable belief. (shrink)

With few exceptions, theorists analyze group attitudes in terms of the attitudes of members. In Epstein 2015, 2019a, 2019b, I argued that this thesis (which I call "MEMBERS ONLY")—and hence any theory that analyzes group attitudes in terms of member attitudes—is mistaken: the attitudes of many groups are ontologically determined by a broader range of factors than member attitudes. My aim in the present paper is to consider new arguments against MEMBERS ONLY. I argue that arguments based on the (...) "hypothesis of the extended mind" are not persuasive for challenging MEMBERS ONLY, but reinforce my earlier arguments, and I also propose new arguments from group content externalism are more promising. (shrink)

'Tis true governments cannot be supported without great charge, and it is fit everyone who enjoys a share of the protection should pay out of his estate his proportion for the maintenance of it. But still it must be with his own consent, i.e., the consent of the majority giving it either by themselves or their representatives chosen by them. For if any one shall claim a power to lay and levy taxes on the people, by his own authority, and (...) without such consent of the people, he thereby invades the fundamental law of property and subverts the end of government. For what property have I in that which another may by right take when he pleases to himself. (shrink)

A recurring theme dominates recent philosophical debates about the nature of conscious perception: naïve realism’s opponents claim that the view is directly contradicted by empirical science. I argue that, despite their current popularity, empirical arguments against naïve realism are fundamentally flawed. The non-empirical premises needed to get from empirical scientific findings to substantive philosophical conclusions are ones the naïve realist is known to reject. Even granting the contentious premises, the empirical findings do not undermine the theory, given its overall philosophical (...) commitments. Thus, contemporary empirical research fails to supply any new argumentative force against naïve realism. I conclude that, as philosophers of mind, we would be better served spending a bit less time trying to wield empirical science as a cudgel against our opponents, and a bit more time working through the implications of each other’s views – something we can accomplish perfectly well from the comfort of our armchairs. (shrink)

Riordan, Marcia Some advocates of embryonic stem cell research want women to be paid for donating their eggs. This article details reasons why this would be bad public policy that would harm women.

We live in a world of crowds and corporations, artworks and artifacts, legislatures and languages, money and markets. These are all social objects — they are made, at least in part, by people and by communities. But what exactly are these things? How are they made, and what is the role of people in making them? In The Ant Trap, Brian Epstein rewrites our understanding of the nature of the social world and the foundations of the social sciences. (...) class='Hi'>Epstein explains and challenges the three prevailing traditions about how the social world is made. One tradition takes the social world to be built out of people, much as traffic is built out of cars. A second tradition also takes people to be the building blocks of the social world, but focuses on thoughts and attitudes we have toward one another. And a third tradition takes the social world to be a collective projection onto the physical world. Epstein shows that these share critical flaws. Most fundamentally, all three traditions overestimate the role of people in building the social world: they are overly anthropocentric. Epstein starts from scratch, bringing the resources of contemporary metaphysics to bear. In the place of traditional theories, he introduces a model based on a new distinction between the grounds and the anchors of social facts. Epstein illustrates the model with a study of the nature of law, and shows how to interpret the prevailing traditions about the social world. Then he turns to social groups, and to what it means for a group to take an action or have an intention. Contrary to the overwhelming consensus, these often depend on more than the actions and intentions of group members. (shrink)

According to Minkoswki, Einstein's special theory of relativity reveals that ‘space by itself, and time by itself are doomed to fade away into mere shadows’. But perceptual experience represents objects as instantiating shapes like squareness — properties of ‘space by itself’. Thus, STR seems to threaten the veridicality of shape experience. In response to this worry, some have argued that we should analyze the contents of our spatial experiences on the model of traditional secondary qualities. On this picture—defended in recent (...) work by Chalmers —an experience of squareness just represents whatever property usually causes such experiences. This view salvages the veridicality of shape experience, but leaves the nature of the properties we perceive outside our ken. I argue that such a move is unwarranted: STR is compatible with the idea that shape experience acquaints us with the spatial character of our world. In defending this claim, I propose a view on which shape experience presents familiar Euclidean spatial properties veridically, while implicitly representing those properties as instantiated in a particular manner — namely, relative to our own frame of reference. (shrink)

The emphasis on duly in Kant's ethics is widely held to constitute a defect. Marcia W. Baron develops and assesses the criticism, which she sees as comprising two objections: that duty plays too large a role, leaving no room for the supererogatory, and that Kant places too much value on acting from duty. Clearly written and cogently argued, Kantian Ethics Almost without Apology takes on the most philosophically intriguing objections to Kant's ethics and subjects them to a rigorous yet (...) sympathetic assessment. (shrink)